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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT MEET




This is not another article about Daubert. The law reviews
have been flooded with commentaries about this landmark case.
This article focuses on a proposal advocated by Professor Michael
Green at a Widener University School of Law symposium on class
actions and expanded on in an article by Professors Green and
Sanders.2 Their thesis is that what courts have been doing by
purporting to follow the dictates of Daubert is deciding issues of
admissibility with little regard for the Daubert criteria, but rather
based on the sufficiency of the evidence to infer a causal
connection and the harm alleged. They argue that not only are
they accurately describing what courts have been doing, but
normatively what they should be doing.4 As we shall see, the
. Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research
Program.
Brooklyn Law Student, Graduating Class 2014.
Searching the Westlaw database for "Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals" with the search limited to "Secondary Sources, Law Reviews
and Journals," returns 3,929 results.
2 Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility Versus Sufficiency:
Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony in the United States (Wake
Forest Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
2016468 & Univ. of Houston Law Ctr., Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 2016468), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2016468. Professor Green presented his thesis at a
Widener Law Journal symposium on "Perspectives on Mass Tort Litigation,"
April 13, 2013. See also Michael D. Green, Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 41 (2013).




Green and Sanders argument has some merit.s However, our
opinion is that Green and Sanders have misconstrued the major
thrust of Daubert. Moreover, the change of the nomenclature to
sufficiency rather than the formal structure set forth in the Daubert
trilogy has the potential to eviscerate Daubert.6 Nomenclature
exerts a powerful influence on how judges decide whether to cut
off a case at an early stage or to let the case go to full trial.7 And,
once a case has gone to full trial, the pressure on a judge not to
grant a judgment N.O.V. is very strong.8 Green and Sanders are
sensitive to the need to have pre-trial hearings that preclude full
5 Some courts appear, in fact, to be doing what Green and Sanders
describe. See infra notes 17 and 34.
6 See Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 41.
In the past decade, tort scholars have engaged in vigorous debate as to
whether 'foreseeability' of harm should be dealt with under the rubric of duty or
proximate cause. The position of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 29 is
that foreseeability should be dealt with in deciding whether the defendant
breached the standard of care or whether the result was within "the risks that
made the actor's conduct tortious." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010). The no-duty formulation
should be limited to high order policy issues that speak to classes of conduct that
tort law immunizes from liability. The Restatement comments make clear that
utilizing duty to decide fact sensitive issues of foreseeability places decision-
making power in the hands of trial judges to negate liability and deprives the
jury of its legitimate role in making fact-based decisions. See id. cmt. f. Several
courts have recently adopted the Restatement view. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009); Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz.
2007). The opposite view is set forth by John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C.
Zipursky in The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law,
and is exemplified in Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion in Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 657 (2001); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
The crux of the debate comes down to whether greater decision-making power
should be placed in the hands of trial judges. Duty is traditionally an issue of law
that is to be decided by the court. Whether foreseeability issues are placed in the
hands of the judge or jury depends on the nomenclature. The author is, in
general, sympathetic to the Restatement formulation but with some reservations.
See Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver, The Violin, and the Scalpel: Duty and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2008).
8 See generally Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 2 (showing that it is
expected for juries to make the determination of fact, thereby making judgment
N.O.V. a less than popular choice for a judge).
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trials based on inadequate expert testimony,9 but switching from
the formality of Daubert to a flexible sufficiency standard
seriously undercuts a trial court's ability to accomplish that goal.
I. THE GREEN AND SANDERS THESIS
At the outset, Green and Sanders acknowledge two major
problems that lead courts to moderate what they call the "worst
consequences" of civil trials in the United States: (1) "party control
of experts;" and (2) "widespread use of jury decision makers."' 0
These two phenomena have led American judges to monitor the
reliability of expert testimony in order to avoid "junk science"
from influencing decisions." Given the constitutional right to a
jury trial, courts seeking to screen ill-founded expert testimony
have resorted to blocking such testimony by challenging the
admissibility of the expert testimony, thus, preempting the case
from reaching the jury in the first place.12 Green and Sanders find
support for their view in pre-Daubert cases that found expert
testimony inadmissible under Rule 703 in order to avoid the
mandate of Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,13 that held that as
long as "experts are willing to testify" about technically complex
9 See id at 14-15 (outlining the standards for adequate expert testimony).
10 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 2 (citing Oscar G. Chase, American
"Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288
(2002)); see also David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the
Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 31 (2013) [hereinafter
Bernstein 2013]. Professor Bernstein identifies two problems. Bernstein 2013,
supra, at 31. The first is allowing "junk science" to go to juries. Id. The second
is "adversarial bias" that permits juries to consider expert testimony from
handpicked experts who opine without substantial reliance on objective
evidence supporting their opinions. Id.; see also David E. Bernstein, Expert
Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert
Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REv. 451, 452-56 (2008) (illustrating a more extensive
discussion of the "adversarial bias").
1 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also Bernstein 2013, supra
note 10, at 31.
12 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 4.
13 Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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matters at the frontiers of scientific knowledge, then the question
of credibility of the experts is for the jury.14
The history preceding the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Daubert has been recited many times over and
there is no need to repeat it here.' 5 The case raised the question of
the admissibility of expert testimony that Bendectin, an anti-nausea
drug taken by women in the first trimester of pregnancy, was a
teratogen.16 In setting the standard for admissibility, the Supreme
Court relied on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
refers to experts with "scientific knowledge."17 The Supreme Court
articulated four non-exclusive factors to determine whether expert
testimony met the threshold of scientific knowledge: (1) "the
known or potential rate of error;" (2) whether the hypothesis of the
plaintiffs theory was subject to testing; (3) peer review and
publication; and (4) whether the plaintiffs premise had received
general acceptance in the scientific community.' 8 Green and
Sanders make it clear that the thrust of their argument is not to
abolish pretrial hearings that screen out unreliable expert
testimony. 19 Rather, they believe that some of the Daubert factors
are unhelpful, 20 and what the courts have actually been doing post-
Daubert is best explained by their utilizing a traditional sufficiency
of the evidence test to determine admissibility.21
They argue that the post-Daubert decisions, General Electric
Co. v. Joiner22 and Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,23 indicate
that the Supreme Court of the United States has moved away "from
14 Id. at 1534; Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 9; see also Bernstein
2013, supra note 10, at 38.
15 See Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 5; Bernstein 2013, supra note 10,
at 31-41 (providing an excellent review of the history).
16 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 13-14; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-85 (1993).
17 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 14; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-90.
18 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 14; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
19 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 15.
20 I. at 19.
21 Id. at 20-2 1.
22 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
23 Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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an emphasis on the Daubert factors."24 Green and Sanders quote
from the following language in Joiner:
Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus,
of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate." He claims that
because the District Court's disagreement was with the
conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the
District Court committed legal error and was properly
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and
the opinion proffered. That is what the District Court did
here, and we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so
doing.25
They conclude that in cases post-Joiner and Kumho Tire, "the
'Daubert factors' seem to play less and less of a role, and are
supplanted by an increasing focus on fit and the existence of large
analytical gaps in reasoning." 26 They review a number of cases that
they claim support their conclusion that courts have been deciding
the admissibility of cutting-edge technological expert testimony on
the issue of causation based on sufficiency of the evidence. 27
Green and Sanders then focus on the litigation involving Parlodel,
a drug taken after childbirth to prevent postpartum lactation in
women who could not, or elected not, to breastfeed their
offspring. 28 Some women who took Parlodel suffered strokes,29
and in a host of cases, plaintiffs alleged that Parlodel was the cause
24 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 21.
25 Id. at 22 (citations omitted) (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146).
26 d. at 24.
27 Id. at 26-34.
28 Id. at 34.
29 Id. at 34-35.
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of their strokes and that the drug manufacturer was at fault for not
warning them about this possible side effect. 30 A strong majority of
courts found that the evidence on causation fell short of the
demanding criteria set forth in Daubert. 3 1 Plaintiffs' evidence was
inadequate because it was based on: (1) idiosyncratic adverse
reaction reports; (2) animal studies; (3) challenge/rechallenge
studies that did not cause strokes when the drug was reintroduced
into the body of patients; and (4) inconclusive epidemiological
studies.32 A few courts found that the evidence passed the Daubert
test and that the expert testimony supported admissibility.3 3
Green and Sanders are not concerned with the inconsistent
results in the Parlodel cases. 34 They note that the Restatement
(Third) of Torts acknowledges "that the line between reasonable
inference and prohibited speculation is one of the more indistinct
lines that exists in [the] law." 35 Green and Sanders give as an
36 3
example two New York cases. In the first, Wolf v. Kaufman,37 a
woman fell down a flight of unlit stairs.38 The defendant was found
30 See Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 35-36.
31 See, e.g., Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441, 577
(W.D. Pa. 2003); Dunn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1053 (S.D. Ill. 2001); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001), affd sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d
1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002); Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 107 F. Supp.
2d 1015, 1044-45 (E.D. Mo. 2000), affd, 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001);
Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233-34 (W.D. Okla.
2000), affd, 289 F.3d 1193, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
32 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 464, 466, 516, 533.
33 See Brasher v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (N.D.
Ala. 2001) (denying motion for summary judgment on grounds that expert
testimony was reliable under Daubert); Eve v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. IP
98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *97-98 (S.D. Ind. March 7,
2001) (denying motion for summary judgment on grounds that expert testimony
was reliable); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., Ill F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180
(N.D. Ala. 2000) (denying motion for summary judgment on grounds that expert
testimony was reliable).
34 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 37.
3s Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010)).
3Id. at 37-38.
3 Wolf v. Kaufman, 227 A.D. 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929).
38 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 37-38; Wolf, 227 A.D. at 281.
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negligent for not having repaired the lights. 39 Justice Finch then
faced the question of whether the unlit stairs were the cause of the
fall. 40 He held that "it would be solely a conjecture for a jury to
draw the conclusion that the deceased fell down the stairs because
of the absence of light."41 Years later, after Justice Finch had been
elevated to the Court of Appeals of New York, he faced a similar
causation issue in Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo.42 This time
the issue "was whether the plaintiffs decedent fell down a flight of
stairs due to a heart attack or dizziness" or whether she fell on a
negligently maintained step, and Justice Finch held that the
question was for the jury.43 The authors say:
Whether the two cases are sufficiently different[]
factually to justify a different outcome is not important.
Rather we think that Parlodel is a modem incarnation of
rulings that courts have long made about when the
evidence introduced in support of an issue is sufficient for
a jury to rule on that issue.
II. THE STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The standard for summary judgment is straightforward.45
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence must be examined in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.46 If there is any evidence
3 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 38 (citing Wolf 227 A.D. at 282).
40 Id. (citing Wolf 227 A.D. at 281).
41 Id. (quoting Wolf, 227 A.D. at 281).
42 Id. (citing Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 14 N.E.2d 828, 828
(N.Y. 1938)).
43 Id. (citing Ingersoll, 14 N.E.2d at 828).
44 Id.
45 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (stating that a motion for summary
judgment will be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law").
46 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("The
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in his favor."); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970) (noting that the moving party has "the burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact," and when determining if that
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from which a reasonable inference can be drawn, the issue is for
the jury.47 This is the test for sufficiency of evidence that Green
and Sanders would have the courts use to make a Daubert
48determination as to whether evidence is admissible on causation.
The problem with the Green and Sanders thesis is that they
place the cart before the horse. It is only when we determine that
something vualifies as "evidence" that we can raise the issue of its
sufficiency. 9 The Daubert trilogy was intended to set a formidable
standard for admissibility before one entered the thicket of
evaluating whether it was sufficient to serve as grounds for
recovery. o If one were to ask, taking the evidence of the expert in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff in Kumho Tire, was the
evidence sufficient to sustain a motion for summary judgment, the
burden is met, evidence "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party"); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 841
F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1987); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758
F.2d 1486, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985).
47 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 255.
48 See Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 21.
49 FED R. CIv. P. 56(c)(1)(B)("A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."
(emphasis added)). The Supreme Court of the United States stated:
We observed further that "[i]t is true that the issue of material fact
required by Rule 56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to
trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party
asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is that sufficient
evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a
jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at
trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). "Inadmissible evidence contributes nothing
to a 'legally sufficient evidentiary basis.' " Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S.
440, 454 (2000) (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993)).
so See generally Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at 28 (explaining that the
Daubert trilogy of cases was caused by courts relying on scientific evidence that
was unsound); William L. Anderson, et al., The "Any Exposure" Theory Round
II - Court Review of Minimal Exposure Expert Testimony in Asbestos and Toxic
Tort Litigation Since 2008, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 17-23 (2012).
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answer must be that it was not.51 The plaintiffs theory of why the
tire exploded was reasonable, and taking that evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the case should have gone to the jury.52
That it did not go to the jury was because the court said it did not
meet the threshold test of reliability. 53 The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Joiner had not lost its senses when it relied on
animal studies to prove that PCBs cause lung cancer.54 If the
question was whether any evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff supported liability, the answer was probably
yes." Once again, the question was whether evidence met the high
threshold of reliability demanded by Daubert.56
In short, one can draw reasonable inferences from unreliable
evidence. The test for reliability must stand on its own bottom.57
5' See generally Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999)
(describing the evidence presented).
52 See generally id. at 142-46 (explaining the deposition testimony of the
plaintiffs expert and showing its reasonableness).
5 Id. at 153. The court in Kumho Tire makes it explicitly clear that the kind
of evidence proffered by the plaintiffs expert might be admissible under
different circumstances, but without proof of its reliability, it could not reach the
jury. Id. at 141, 147, 149, 153. The Court stated:
[N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of
observations based on extensive and specialized experience. Nor does
anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be
identified by qualified experts through visual or tactile inspection of
the tire. .. . As we said before . . . the question before the trial court
was specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this
particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the
jurors "in deciding the particular issues in the case."
Id. at 156.
54 See Joiner v. Gen. Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996) rev'd,
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
5 Justice Stevens' concurrence/dissent in Joiner makes this point
absolutely clear: "[U]sing this methodology, it would seem that an expert could
reasonably have concluded that the study of workers at an Italian capacitor
plant, coupled with data from Monsanto's study and other studies, raises an
inference that PCB's promote lung cancer." Joiner, 522 U.S. at 154 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). That this inference was not enough to
raise the expert's evidence to the level of admissibility shows that more than a
summary judgment sufficiency standard is being asked for by the Supreme
Court of the United States. See id at 153.
56 Joiner, 78 F.3d at 532.
5 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Green and Sanders are correct that the Daubert criteria in and of
itself may be of lesser importance as tests of reliability.5 8 But, the
message from the Daubert trilogy is unmistakable: a court must
have a high degree of confidence in the integrity of scientific
evidence before it qualifies for consideration in any formal test to
be utilized in litigation.59 The reason is not only that we mistrust
juries or that experts are partisan. For the most part, Daubert has
been used as a screen in toxic tort cases. 6 1 Once it is found that a
given agent is a carcinogen or affects the autoimmune system of a
human being, the implication is enormous. 62 Hundreds, often
thousands, of cases ride on the outcome, and billions of dollars
may be at stake. 63 The sufficiency standard utilized to determine
58 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 15; see also Anderson, et al., supra
note 50, at 18. The Supreme Court has also made this point abundantly clear:
We agree with the Solicitor General that "[t]he factors identified in
Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability,
depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise,
and the subject of his testimony." . . . The conclusion, in our view, is
that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time
the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now
do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by
kind of evidence. Too much depends upon the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150.
59 "[T]he court ultimately based its decision upon Carlson's failure to
satisfy either Daubert's factors or any other set of reasonable reliability criteria.
In light of the record as developed by the parties, that conclusion was within the
District Court's lawful discretion." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158 (emphasis in
original). "To be sure, a trial court has a range of discretion to determine
whether the testimony is in fact admissible, but the court does not have
discretion in whether or not to conduct a rigorous, gatekeeping inquiry into the
reliability of the expert testimony." Anderson, et al., supra note 50, at 21.
60 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 3. "When confronted with a 'battle of
the experts' with each side claiming that his scientific judgment either does or
does not support a finding of causation, lay jurors have no means by which they
can determine whose judgment is superior." Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at
69.
61 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
62 See generally id. at I (noting that the inclusion or exclusion of expert
testimony can have a "profound impact" on a case and civil litigation in
general).
61 See id. at 1, 7.
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whether a plaintiff has produced adequate evidence to survive
summary judgment is, and always will be, minimal.64 The Daubert
standard is anything but minimal.s The four criteria set forth by
the Supreme Court of the United States were a signal that they
expected courts to be demanding gatekeepers and that the era that
preceded Daubert, where experts could opine to their heart's
content, was over.66 Thus, even if the four criteria in and of
themselves are of lesser formal importance, the message that the
court set by engaging formal criteria was that it was establishing a
high threshold for admissibility. 67 The minimalist language
conjured by the term "sufficiency of the evidence" to overcome a
motion for summary judgment understates by the proverbial
country mile' what the court expects from its gatekeeper judges.68
6 All reasonable inferences are drawn in the opposing party's favor both
where the underlying facts are undisputed and when they are in controversy.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
The non-movant's version of any disputed issue of fact is presumed correct. Id.
at 468.
65 See Anderson, et al., supra note 50, at 17-23 (discussing the Daubert
standard).
66 The Supreme Court of the United States stated:
The objective of [the gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the
reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that
an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). "[I]n 1993, the
Supreme Court's decision in [Daubert] expressly rejected the let-it-all-in
standard in favor of a new reliability standard." Bernstein 2013, supra note 10,
at 41.
67 As stated previously, if all reasonable inferences had been drawn in
favor of the plaintiffs and if the non-movant's facts were presumed correct in
Joiner and Kumho Tire, then the Supreme Court would not have heard those
cases. See, e.g., Joiner v. Gen. Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996).
That the Supreme Court did not use the Rule 56 summary judgment standard in
the Daubert trilogy and instead created a new standard is proof that they did not
want courts to rely on the familiar sufficiency standard. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
68 See Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 1, 11.
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III. THE PARLODEL CONTROVERSY
Green and Sanders point to the conflicting opinions as to
whether plaintiffs could survive Daubert motions as nothing more
than the standard difficulty that courts have when deciding
causation cases.69 Is the evidence sufficient to allow a jury to draw
a reasonable inference, or is it so weak, or the opposing evidence
so lopsided, that to give the case to the jury would result in sheer
speculation. 70 They are not troubled that some courts come down
on one side of the issue and some on the other. 71 The authors of
72this article are considerably troubled by the divergent opinions.
Parlodel was a drug marketed by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
Corporation to treat a broad range of diseases, such as Parkinson's
Disease. 73 In 1981, the FDA approved Parlodel as a preventative of
physiological lactation (PPL) for women who either could not or
did not want to breastfeed.74 Over the years, there were adverse
case reports that women who took Parlodel suffered seizures,
strokes, and cardiovascular problems. Lawsuits ensued, alleging
that Sandoz did not adequately warn about the dangers attendant to
the use of Parlodel for women who were taking the drug to stop
69 Id. at 39-40.
70 Id at 39.
71 See id.
72 Divergent opinions in toxic torts may have profound influence on
manufacturing industries, and especially pharmaceuticals. See generally id. at 1
(noting the profound impact the Daubert standard has had since its creation). A
finding of liability in one district, circuit, or state based on faulty evidence and a
low admission standard would lead to forum-shopping, increased insurance rates
for manufacturers, and higher prices, as well as limited availability of consumer
goods. Anderson, et al., supra note 50, at 13-14. For example:
Court acceptance/rejection of the [any exposure] theory continues to
dominate what kind of and how many asbestos cases can be filed in
jurisdictions where these cases are common. Perhaps as important,
the decisions result in even more blatant forum shopping than
otherwise might occur, because plaintiffs seek out the jurisdictions
that allow this testimony to support a low dose case.
Id. at 14.
1 Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 442 (W.D. Pa.
2003).
74 id.
7 1 Id. at 445.
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lactation.76 For the purposes of this article, we shall assume that
plaintiffs could establish that the warnings provided to physicians
were inadequate. The difficult question in these cases concerned
whether there was adequate proof that Parlodel caused strokes and
cardiovascular problems. In a different forum, one of the authors
of this article argued that even absent such proof plaintiffs should
be awarded a modicum of damages for the mental distress suffered
as a result of being exposed to a lifestyle drug (for which there
were safer alternatives to accomplish the desired result).7 8
However, plaintiffs in the Parlodel cases were not pursuing this
more modest action. 79 They were seeking high awards on the
theory that Parlodel caused their serious physical ailments.s The
defendant in each case raised a vigorous Daubert defense, claiming
that there was no scientific evidence that met Daubert standards to
support a finding of causation and that the cases should be
dismissed on summary judgment.8 1
Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.82 sets forth the most
comprehensive analysis of the various arguments that plaintiffs
propounded in support of their position and why the court found
them woefully inadequate in meeting Daubert standards. 83
Consider the following:
I. Plaintiffs doctor prescribed a fifteen day dose of 5
mg/day to be taken in two 2.5 mg doses per day.84
Twenty-three days after discharge she suffered a
hemorrhagic stroke (ICH).15
76 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
n See Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
78 See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 257, 285 (2005).
79 See Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (stating that the plaintiff brought a
claim for products liability).
o Id. at 442.
81 Id. at 525.
82 Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
83 Id. at 526-29.
* Id. at 446.
" Id. at 447.
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II. Between 1980 and 1994, ten million women were
estimated to have taken Parlodel for PPL.86 During this
period of time, thirty cases of strokes and nine cases of
myocardial infarction (heart attacks) were reported for
women who took Parlodel for PPL.
III. Bromocriptine is the active ingredient in Parlodel that
prevents lactation by blocking "the secretion of the
hormone Prolactin, which acts on the breasts to induce
secretion of milk."8 8
IV. It is undisputed that all postpartum women are subject
to a significant increased risk of strokes regardless of
whether they had taken Parlodel.89 One epidemiological
study found that "the risk of ICH during the postpartum
period [was] 28.3 times higher than in similarly aged
women who [were] not postpartum." 90
V. Another study found "that women taking
bromocriptine were eight times less likely than women
not taking bromocriptine to develop stroke in the
postpartum period." 91
VI. Not a single epidemiological study demonstrated a
statistically significant increase in strokes in postpartum
women who had taken Parlodel.92
Faced with the lack of epidemiological evidence and with the
admitted significantly higher incidence of idiopathic risks of
strokes for postpartum women, plaintiffs argued that both animal
studies and the chemical properties of bromocriptine supported the
" Id. at 444.
87 id.
8 8 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46.
8 9 Id. at 450.
90 Id. at 456; see also Steven J. Kittner, et al., Pregnancy and the Risk of
Stroke, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 768, 772 (Sept. 12, 1996).
91 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
92 Id. at 450.
654 [Vol. 23
2014] A CRITIQUE OF THE GREEN-SANDERS PROPOSAL
conclusion that Parlodel was a vasoconstrictor and was thus
capable of causing a stroke. 93
One study conducted on humans injected Parlodel into a hand
vein and found that it caused vasoconstriction. 94 However, "[a]
woman would have to [have taken] 5,000 Parlodel® 2.5 mg tablets
in a single dose to place the same amount of bromocriptine in her
bloodstream as was used in the 'hand vein study.' "95 As to animal
studies, plaintiffs relied on a "hind limb" study in which Parlodel
was infused into the hind limb of dogs in three doses: "1
microgram/kilogram; 5 micrograms/kilogram; and 25
micrograms/kilogram." 96 Vasoconstriction was found to have taken
place only at the highest dosage. 97 Further, "a woman taking
standard 2.5 mg Parlodelo tablets would need to take 1,250 tablets
at a time to place the same amount of Parlodel® in her bloodstream
as was used in the 25 microgram/kilogram assay of the hind limb
study."98
Plaintiffs' expert also relied on a "62-week oral toxicity study
in dogs" to support the conclusion that Parlodel caused strokes.99
In this study, animals received bromocriptine for sixty-two weeks
and developed ear necrosis, suggesting that the chemical caused
vasoconstriction. 00  "In the dog study, animals received
bromocriptine for 62 weeks," whereas women would take Parlodel
for two or three weeks.' 0' In this study, dogs ingested Parlodel at
roughly fourteen times the daily dosage prescribed to women
taking Parlodel.102 "Viewed over the full length of the study," the
dogs ingested more than 280 times the Parlodel taken by a woman
for PPL. 03 A similar oral toxicity study done on rats resulted in ear
necrosis.104 However, here too, the daily dose given to the rats did
9 Id. at 461-62, 466-72.
94 Id. at 453.
95Id.
96 Id. at 467.
97 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
98 Id. at 468.
99 Id. at 469.
100
10 Id.
'03 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
'0 Id. at 470.
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not demonstrate necrosis until they ingested 280 times the daily
dose of a plaintiff taking Parlodel for PPL. 05 Neither the dogs nor
the rats developed ICH at even the very high dosages.' 06
In Soldo, the court appointed experts pursuant to Rule 70 6 .107
Two of the experts found that there was inadequate evidence to
support a finding of general causation between Parlodel and ICH
strokes. One expert, relying primarily on differential diagnosis,
was prepared to find general causation between Parlodel and
ICH. 0 9 The court rejected the expert's opinion for two reasons.
First, the error rate in using differential diagnosis is impermissibly
high.1 10 Second, given the risk of idiopathic strokes in the general
population and the especially high risk of strokes in postpartum
women in particular, one cannot find general causation. I
The Parlodel cases that found the evidence of causation
admissible and thus, denied summary judgment, are extremely
weak, and it is difficult to see how they passed Daubert scrutiny.112
The evidence may have passed the minimalist test for summary
judgment advocated by Green and Sanders, but does not come
105 d.
106 Id. at 469-70. In terms of general causation, these studies would only
prove that Parlodel causes stroke under the "any exposure" theory. Id. at 473,
530-3 1; Anderson, et al., supra note 50, at 1-2. This "post hoc ergo procter hoc"
theory postulates that because there is evidence of the disease, any exposure to a
known cause of that disease proves a causal link. David E. Bernstein, Keeping
Junk Science out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 11, 20 (2003). The
theory came into prominence during asbestos litigation. Id. at 12. In the asbestos
cases, it was known that there was a link between asbestos and mesothelioma,
but the amount of asbestos that would trigger mesothelioma beyond the
background risk in a plaintiff was unknown. Id Some courts reasoned that any
exposure to asbestos was enough to find the defendant companies liable. See
Anderson, et al., supra note 50, at 5. This line of reasoning has fallen out of
favor with most courts, which have since found it unreliable under the Daubert
standards. Id.
'




"' Id. at 517; see Kittner, et al., supra note 90, at 772.
12 See generally supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (describing the
evidence and showing that a minority of courts found the evidence adequate).
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close to meeting Daubert standards." 3 Thus, in Brasher v. Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals, Corp.,"l4 the court supports admissibility
primarily on the basis of animal tests and differential diagnosis."15
As noted earlier, the animal tests were conducted with doses at
huge multiples (ranging from 280 times to 5,000 times the dosage
taken by humans).' Putting to one side that drawing analogies
from animals to humans requires a leap of faith, the disparity in
dosage is so great that it is difficult to see how animal studies can
be a factor in deciding causation.'" As to differential diagnosis,
the unquestioned fact that postpartum women have a significantly
higher rate of idiopathic strokes (unrelated to ingestion of
Parlodel), one wonders how one can reach any conclusion with
regard to causation. 1s Adverse reaction reports are similarly
suspect. 119 There is no way to ascertain whether the adverse
reactions were from the drug or from the substantially higher
background risk of stroke for postpartum women.1 The Brasher
113 If all the facts are drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
any reasonable inference is allowed to reach the jury, a series of studies that
show Parlodel causes vasoconstriction when given to dogs and rats in incredibly
high doses would allow the inference. See Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 469-70.
But, the question under the Daubert standard is whether this is the kind of
inference a scientist, employing the same rigor in the courtroom as they would
in their relevant field, would make. Id. at 504. The difficulties of analogizing
animal studies to humans, as well as the extremely high doses at issue, would
prevent a scientist from reaching this conclusion. Id. at 466. "To extrapolate
from the conditions of a study to more general circumstances always raises
questions." DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, STATISTICS & RESEARCH METHODS
§§ 6:8, 6:12 (2012-13 ed.).
114 Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ala.
2001).
Id. at 1296.116 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
11 See Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
118 Id. at 450; Kittner, et al., supra note 90, at 768.
"19 See Parlodel, Adverse Reactions from Postmarketing Experience,
DRUGS.COM (Oct. 2012), http://www.drugs.com/pro/parlodel.html ("Because
adverse reactions from spontaneous reports are reported voluntarily from a
population of uncertain size, it is generally not possible to reliably estimate their
frequency or establish a causal relationship to drug exposure.").




court relies on the ERI study, which found an 8.4 "increase in the
likelihood of stroke in postpartum women [who had taken]
Parlodel."l 2 1 The court neglects to reveal that the study was done
on ten postpartum women who had strokes, only one of which
occurred in a woman who had taken Parolodel.122 The court simply
states that the study was not statistically valid.12 3 It is more than
not statistically valid - it is utterly worthless.12 4
Very simply, these cases do not require reliance on the ipse
dixit language of Joiner; they do not even meet the requirement
that the "reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid."1 25 How did the Brasher court, and the others
who found the weak expert testimony in the Parlodel cases
admissible, go so wrong? Although it paid lip service to
Daubert,126 it, in reality, skipped Daubert and went directly to the
121 Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ala.
2001).
122 Soldo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
123 Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
124 Some courts have reasoned that statistical insignificance, especially
with epidemiological studies, is not a bar to admission, and have given even
more leverage when the disease/harm at issue is incredibly rare. See Milward v.
Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2011). But an issue
being at the frontier of scientific knowledge is not a reason to allow unreliable
evidence, or unreliable conclusions drawn from that evidence, to reach the jury.
Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at 59. "Nothing in the Daubert trilogy or Rule
702 suggests that the plaintiffs burden is lessened simply because the issue is on
the frontier of medical knowledge or because strong contrary evidence has not
been presented by the defendant." Id.
125 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
Reliability is the measure by which a study can be repeated - it refers to that
study's consistency or reproducibility. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note
113, § 5:10. Validity is "the extent to which something measures what it
purports to measure. A measure can have no more validity than it has
reliability." Id. The faults described with the studies offered in the Parlodel cases
undermine those studies' reliability and validity, leaving them inadmissible
under the Daubert standards. Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d
1046, 1053 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
126 Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-99; Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.,
111 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176-79 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.,
No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *97-98 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
7,2001).
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test for summary judgment.127 Summary judgment does not
demand, as Daubert does, that expert testimony meet "exacting
standards of reliability."l 2 8 The summary judgment standard is far
less demanding and allows the weakest of inferences to suffice to
defeat the motion. 129
At bottom, Brasher relies on what has become known as the
"weight of the evidence" test, advocated by Justice Stevens in
Joiner.130 The court admits that none of the "bits of evidence"
provided by plaintiff standing alone support a finding of causation,
but that taken together they "present a compelling picture" of
causation. 13 1 Putting to one side whether reliance on the Stevens'
dissent is appropriate, the difficultly with the court's conclusion is
that the "bits" that the court relies on are inherently incredible.132
The statement that experts rely on "animal studies, case reports,
and pharmacological comparisons of similar classes of drugs to
infer conclusions" 3 3 is of little significance unless we are told that
scientists would, for example, rely on animal studies with exposure
of several hundred or several thousand times that which was
administered to women taking Parlodel.134 One cannot add
together five times nothing and conclude that a meaningful integer
has been attained.135
127 Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1299; Globetti, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1179;
Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *97-98.
128 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
129 See supra Part II.
130 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Professor Green has written
persuasively in support of the "weight of the evidence" approach. See Michael
D. Green, Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLY 41, 41
(2013) (using this approach in his most recent argument).
11 Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
132 See id (acknowledging that none of the evidence is conclusive).
13 id.
134 See supra notes 87, 90, 93, and 96.
135 Similarly, in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products, much emphasis was
placed on the fact that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit endorsed the
"weight of the evidence" approach, rather than the "atomistic" approach taken by
the majority in Joiner. Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at 29. The issue in
Milward was whether exposure to benzene caused a specific form of leukemia
(APL). Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.




The Green and Sanders thesis that what courts are and should
be doing is testing causation utilizing a sufficiency of the evidence
test is, in our opinion, simply wrong. The test for summary
judgment is not demanding. Daubert, Joiner, and Khumo Tire are
very demanding. Whether the reason is adversarial bias or the
desire to eliminate "junk science," the Daubert trilogy seeks a high
level of belief in the integrity of scientific evidence.136 The
comparison that Green and Sanders draw from run of the mill tort
cases, where courts differ as to whether one can draw an inference
of causation from cases very similar on their facts, is not
that benzene affects an undifferentiated stem-cell in the blood, rather than a
differentiated cell with stem-cell-like self-replicating abilities; (2) that because
benzene has been proven to cause some types of chromosomal damage, it is
plausible that it causes the specific kind of chromosomal damage in evidence in
the APL type of leukemia; (3) that because benzene has been shown to disrupt a
particular enzyme (one that facilitates the replication of DNA without damage),
and disruption of that enzyme has been proven to cause other types of leukemia,
it is plausible that this same enzymatic disruption plays a role in the creation of
APL leukemia; and finally (4) statistically insignificant epidemiological
evidence showing a causal relationship between benzene and APL leukemia. Id.
at 19-20. We have considerable difficulty with the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit's opinion. First, the most that Dr. Smith was able to conclude with each
piece of evidence was that it was "plausible" that benzene was related to APL
leukemia. Id. at 21-26. In countering evidence on the defense side, Dr. Smith did
little to undercut his opinion that the relationship between benzene and APL was
merely plausible. Id. What one comes away with from a careful reading of Dr.
Smith's opinion is that he has nothing more than a guess. Whatever the Daubert
trilogy stands for, it clearly does not endorse liability built on a guess. Second,
there is nothing in Dr. Smith's opinion which demonstrates how he analyzed and
combined the studies or that he engaged in a process that would pass muster
under Daubert reliability standards. See Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at 57 &
n.175. Failure to do so gives an expert the freedom to engage in the kind of ipse
dixit conclusions prohibited by Joiner. How one puts together a set of 'might be'
pieces of evidence requires an explanation as to whether reliable scientific
methods were utilized to reach his conclusion. The fact that Dr. Smith's opinion
was the best that he could do with the underdeveloped state of the evidence is
precisely the kind of opinion that the Daubert trilogy was designed to preclude.
This is not merely negating weak evidence. It allows courts to consider evidence
that on its own bottom says nothing more than 'maybe.'
136 Bernstein 2013, supra note 10, at 31.
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apposite.13 7 First, those cases do not instantiate the Daubert criteria
and do not bring to bear the concerns that are peculiar to
illegitimate use of speculative science. Second, run of the mill tort
cases have limited precedential value. Admittedly, a grant of
directed verdict may be used as authority in other cases, but tort
cases are too fact sensitive to influence results in other cases. The
methodology for inferring causation in toxic tort cases has
enormous precedential value. Not only will a faulty causation
inference influence cases dealing with the identical drug or toxic
agent, but the loosening of the standards of admissibility along the
lines that Green and Sanders suggest will have enormous
significance in other toxic tort cases. The issue is not whether a
particular case falls on one side of the line or the other. Reasonable
persons can differ even using reliable scientific evidence as to
whether general or specific causation has been established. But the
rigor of reliability set forth by the Daubert trilogy and the
redrafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence should not be
compromised. Unfortunately, the Green and Sanders proposal does
just that.
137 Green & Sanders, supra note 2, at 39-40.
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